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Robert Brandom‟s expressivism argues that not all semantic content may be made fully 
explicit. This view connects in interesting ways with recent movements in philosophy of 
mathematics and logic (e.g. Brown, Shin, Giaquinto) to take diagrams seriously  as 
more than a mere „heuristic aid‟ to proof, but either proofs themselves, or irreducible 
components of such. However what exactly is a diagram in logic? Does this constitute a 
semiotic natural kind? The paper will argue that such a natural kind does exist in Charles 
Peirce‟s conception of iconic signs, but that fully understood, logical diagrams involve a 
structured array of normative reasoning practices, as well as just a „picture on a page‟.   
 
 
1. Introduction: 19
th
 Century “Picture Shock” 
20th century mainstream analytic philosophy was almost entirely neglectful of diagrams 
in its theorizing about semantic content, and reasoning. It is worth understanding the 
historical background to this arguably contingent state of philosophical affairs.  
     The trend began in mathematics. In the 19th century this field was revolutionized by 
an arithematization movement, and some of the key developments foregrounded ways in 
which our “visual expectations in mathematics”1 might deliver the wrong answer about 
mathematical fact. A famous example is the claim that a function which is everywhere 
continuous must be differentiable, which is in fact false. Attempting to evaluate this using 
visual imagination, one may imagine that if a function is continuous then it contains no 
„gaps‟ or „breaks‟, and then one seems to „see‟ that at some sufficiently fine-grained level 
it must present a smooth surface, which would have a gradient, and thus a derivative. 
However, to the surprise of many, Weierstrass and Bolzano proved that certain functions 
are infinitely finely jagged, yet still gap-free in a way that fits the formal definition of 
continuity.
2
 Another example is whether a 1-dimensional line might fill a 2-dimensional 
region. Any attempt to mentally picture something resembling an infinitely thin thread 
unspooling into a finite area and thereby „filling it in‟ seems to show that the claim is 
                                                 
1
 This phrase is taken from Marcus Giaquinto (Giaquinto, 2007, p. 3) 
2
 This example is nicely discussed in (Giaquinto, 2007, pp. 3-4), and (Mumma, 2010, pp. 3-4).  
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false, but Peano proved it true.
3
 Such examples prompted some of the most influential 
mathematicians of the 19
th
 century to draw strong morals about the potential for error in 
diagrammatic reasoning. As Marcus Giaquinto writes: 
Such cases seemed to show not merely that we are prone to make mistakes when 
thinking visually…but also that visual understanding actually conflicts with the 
truths of analysis (Giaquinto, 2007, pp. 4-5). 
Hilbert famously wrote, “a theorem is only proved when the proof is completely 
independent of the diagram” (Giaquinto, 2007, p. 8), drawing on an almost identical 
remark by Moritz Pasch in his influential Lectures in Modern Geometry (1882). So, 
remarkably, even the field of geometry, it came to be seen, needed to be purged of 
diagrams.
4
 The end result was a “prevailing conception of mathematical proof” which 
John Mumma describes as “purely sentential”: 
A proof…is a sequence of sentences. Each sentence is either an assumption of the 
proof, or is derived via sound inference rules from sentences preceding it. The 
sentence appearing at the end of the sequence is what has been prove (Mumma, 
2010, p. 1) 
     This suspicion of „visual expectations‟ then flowed into Frege‟s work on the 
foundations of mathematics. Cognizant of the errors which his fellow mathematicians had 
learned to skirt, Frege attempted to entirely remove „intuition‟ from the logic with which 
he set to put mathematics on an entirely new and more rigorous foundation. Famously, he 
remarked of his own concept-script: 
So that nothing intuitive could intrude here unnoticed, everything had to depend on 
the chain of inference being free of gaps. (Begriffsschrift IV, Beaney p. 48) 
Frege argued against the empiricism of John Stuart Mill that numbers were not properties 
abstracted from the physical world, but definable purely analytically. 
      Frege in turn was an enormous influence on logical positivism (Carnap studied under 
him, for instance), which in turn set the scene for philosophy‟s aims and methodologies 
in many ways that are still being worked out today. The movement‟s early strict focus on 
                                                 
3
 Discussed in (Giaquinto, 2007, pp. 4-5).  
4
 “A body of work emerged in the late 19th century which grounded elementary geometry in abstract 
axiomatic theories…This development is now universally regarded as a methodological breakthrough. 
Geometric relations which previously were logically free-floating, because they were understood via 
diagrams, were given a firm footing with precisely defined primitives and axioms” (Mumma, 2010, p. 6). 
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clarifying meaning owed much to Frege‟s vision of an ideal language all of whose 
inferential steps are explicitly stated, and use a set of rules specified in advance.
5
 Thus 
A.J. Ayer laid down a strict definition of “literal significance” as confined to claims 
which have “factual content” by virtue of offering “empirical hypotheses” (Ayer, 1952, p. 
2). Thus, to illustrate by way of a simple example, “The cat is on the mat” is literally 
significant because there is a cat-being-on-the-mat type experience which might be had – 
or not – in the relevant situations.  
     Claims which lack “literal significance” fall into two camps. Either they can be 
“literally false” but somehow “the creation of a work of Art” which is gestured towards 
as valuable, though Ayer is somewhat vague about how. Or, worse, claims might be 
“pseudo-propositions”  disguised nonsense. Any claim lacking literal significance is not 
the purview of philosophy (Ayer, 1952, p. 2). It is hard to see how a diagram could offer 
an empirical hypothesis, and thus have literal significance in Ayer‟s sense. And he 
briskly dismisses the idea that a philosopher might be “endowed with a faculty of 
intellectual intuition which enabled him to know facts that could not be known through 
sense-experience” (Ayer, 1952, p. 1). Likewise, the early Carnap (1932) claimed that 
statements were meaningful if syntactically well-formed and their non-logical terms 
reducible to observational terms in the natural sciences.  
     It is well-known that crisp, clean criteria for what constitutes a genuine empirical 
hypothesis were much more difficult to find than Ayer imagined. Carnap dropped back 
from verifiability to “partial testability” (1936-7), and confirmation became a more and 
more holistic affair, until finally Quine acknowledged that what meets the tribunal of 
experience is in an important sense the whole of science. By way of consolation for thus 
sounding verificationism‟s death-knell, he offered a new criterion of what might be called 
„factuality‟: if we could imagine our science collated and regularized into a single theory 
expressed in first-order logic, its bound variables would have values. In a pseudo-science 
such as witchcraft they would not (Quine, 1953). Now we can say that “The cat is on the 
mat” is factual because in the logical formula x(Cx & Oxm) suitably interpreted, the 
variable x binds to Fluffy.  
                                                 
5
 although transposed into a rigidly empiricist setting which truth be told sits oddly with Frege‟s thinking– 
and arguably has caused significant problems in the philosophy of mathematics. 
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     Philosophers‟ banishment of diagrams from semantics and theory of inference 
arguably reached a high-water mark in the late „60s with the publication of Quine‟s 
colleague Nelson Goodman‟s Languages of Art. Here Goodman made an influential 
argument that resemblance plays no interesting or important role in signification. Rather, 
he claimed that denotation, “is the core of representation and is independent of 
resemblance” (p. 5). His reasoning was that while the resemblance relation is symmetric 
(if X resembles Y then Y resembles X), the representation relation is not.
6
  
    However, a profound challenge to this more than century-long neglect of diagrams is 
„in the air‟. It seeks to reconceive diagrams as more than a mere „heuristic aid‟ to proof in 
mathematics and logic. Rather diagrams may be understood as capable of serving either 
as proofs themselves, or irreducible components of such. Thus James R. Brown writes: 
…the prevailing attitude is that pictures are really no more than heuristic devices…I 
want to oppose this view and to make a case for pictures having a legitimate role to 
play as evidence and justification – a role well beyond the heuristic. In short, pictures 
can prove theorems (Brown, 2008, p. 96). 
John Mumma writes:  
In the past 15 years, a sizeable literature consciously opposed to [the attitude that 
pictures do not prove anything in mathematics] has emerged. The work ranges from 
technical presentations of formal diagrammatic systems of proof (e.g. (Shin, 1994)) 
to philosophical arguments for the mathematical legitimacy of pictures (e.g. (Brown, 
1997), (Dove, 2002)) (Mumma, 2010, p. 8). 
Meanwhile Marcus Giaquinto has produced an interesting new book in mathematical 
epistemology, where he writes:  
….a time-honoured view, still prevalent, is that the utility of visual thinking in 
mathematics is only psychological, not epistemological….The chief aim of this work 
is to put that view to the test (Giaquinto, 2007, p. 1). 
Other authors have returned to ancient Greek mathematical texts to argue that one cannot 
understand them fully without taking diagrams more seriously (Catton and Montelle, 
2010).
7
 
                                                 
6
 Randall Dipert has argued against this that it no more follows that resemblance is „entirely independent 
of‟ representation because the former relation is symmetric and the latter is not, than that the brother 
relation is „entirely independent of‟ the uncle relation as the former is symmetric and the latter is not 
(Dipert, 1996). 
7
 See also, from a more philological perspective, the work of Reviel Netz, e.g. “The Limits of Text in Greek 
Mathematics” (2005). 
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     Meanwhile, in logic, Sun-Joo Shin argues that although, “[f]or more than a century, 
symbolic representation systems have been the exclusive subject for formal logic” (Shin, 
2004, p. 1), this should be widened to also consider “heterogeneous systems”, which 
“employ both symbolic and diagrammatic elements” (Shin, 2004, p. 1). This is an 
influential term which derives from Jon Barwise (1993). Shin argues that symbolic and 
heterogeneous reasoning systems have different strengths and weaknesses, and we should 
do a thorough study to get the best out of both, bearing in mind that different disciplines 
which might draw on such systems (such as logic, artificial intelligence and philosophy 
of mind) might have different needs. 
     This paper seeks to join these authors while at the same time to put this goal in a 
broader context, namely a movement which is also aimed at unbuilding the simple picture 
of “literal significance” that has been so influential in the 20th century – expressivism.  
 
Expressivism: Saying, Doing and Picturing 
Expressivism has a metaethical incarnation, as a view that, “…claims some interesting 
disanalogy between…evaluations and descriptions of the world” (Chrisman, 2011, p. 1). 
By contrast, Robert Brandom has put forward a semantic expressivism, whose main point 
is that not all semantic content may be made fully explicit. This view contrasts with a 
widespread view often thought to be intuitively obvious, and arguably a downstream 
spectre of Ayer‟s notion of literal significance. I will call it a metaphysical realist 
semantics. The juxtaposition here is deliberately somewhat controversial, given that 
many metaphysical realists take great pains to make a clear separation between 
metaphysical and semantic questions, and to claim that their view lies firmly on the 
metaphysical side. An argument will be put forward later in the paper that this self-
assessment is problematic.  
     A metaphysical realist semantics holds that the purpose of language is to state “facts” 
which, if the propositions stating them are true, are part of language-independent reality. 
Thus, to return to our earlier example, “The cat is on the mat” (suitably disambiguated as 
to cats and mats) is thought to present a „content‟ which it is sufficient to know the 
meaning of the statement‟s words to fully understand. Brandom calls the view 
P a g e  | 6 
 
representationalism. By contrast, he argues that the primary purpose of language is to 
transform what we do into something that we can say:  
By expressivism I mean the idea that discursive practice makes us special in enabling 
us to make explicit, in the form of something we can say or think, what otherwise 
remains implicit in what we do. (Testa, 2003, p. 561, cited in Price, 2011) 
Crucially, this renders the explicit statement semantically parasitic on the implicit 
practice, in that one cannot fully understand the statement without antecedently 
understanding the practice which it “expresses”. Thus Brandom writes:    
…we need not yield to the temptation…to think of what is expressed and the 
expression of it as individually intelligible independently of consideration of the 
relations between them…And the explicit may not be specifiable apart from 
consideration of what is made explicit  (Brandom, 2000 , pp. 8-9). 
     Consider for example, the invention of musical notation. This freed musicians from 
having to learn music by directly copying a live musician‟s actions. Instead a musical 
score substitutes dots on a page for string-pluckings, key tappings, and all other actions 
which might produce a note. In this way a musical score can say what musicians do (with 
added bonuses such as that the score can be indefinitely copied, survive longer than any 
living musician, and be readily compared and contrasted with other scores). However, it 
is not possible to fully understand a musical score without having some antecedent 
understanding of the practices of music which it is expressing.  For instance, if aliens 
were to stumble upon the score for Beethoven‟s 5th symphony, it is highly unlikely they 
could perform it without some anthropological observation of human musical actions.  
     This commitment to a parasitism of the explicit statement on the implicit practice 
renders expressivism a form of pragmatism. It claims that certain practices are not fully 
explicated in language, but presupposed by it. Pragmatism is frequently seen as a form of 
antirealism, merely internal realism
8
, non-cognitivism
9
, non-factualism
10
, or as some 
would put it “quasi-realism”11. But the conclusion of this paper will consider other views 
on this.  
                                                 
8
 (Putnam, 1992) , (Blackburn, 1998). 
9
 Price suggests Rorty approaches a global non-cognitivism in (Price, 2008). 
10
 This term derives from (Boghossian, 1990). 
11
 The term was coined by Simon Blackburn, see in particular (Blackburn, 1984). Its links with pragmatism 
are explored in (Price, 1998), though (Macarthur and Price, 2007) argues that the two views share 
important similarities and differences.  
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     Such an expressivism may make sense for music, but might it be generalized? For 
Brandom wishes it to be a global view, concerning all language. In particular, might 
expressivism be applied to talk about logic? Surely the matters of truth-preservingness 
and validity are a paradigm of practice-independent fact? Not so, according to Brandom. 
He claims that logic also should be seen as a way of saying what we are doing when we 
actually make inferences, in ways that can guide our reasoning in systematic and useful 
ways. In fact he self-consciously highlights the practice of philosophy itself as a 
particularly sophisticated pulling of unselfconscious implicit practices into explicit 
statements that might be critically appraised (Brandom, 2000, pp. 56-7).  
     Brandom‟s expressivism may be linked in interesting ways with Wittgenstein‟s 
Picture Theory of Meaning
12
. In the Tractatus Wittgenstein drew a famous distinction 
between what is said (namely atomic facts, and their truth-functional combinations) and 
what is shown (the laws of logic, the limits of the world and, interestingly in the 
expressivist context, ethics). In a Brandomian spirit we might describe the former as 
“explicit” and the latter as “implicit”. However, having drawn this distinction between 
saying and showing, Wittgenstein made the further claim that what is shown cannot be 
said (and thus for instance logic is transcendental). Early Wittgenstein and Brandom 
stand out amongst mainstream semantics in sharing the bold claim that not everything 
true can be made explicit, or stated. They are also different in two ways, however. Firstly, 
where Wittgenstein suggested that “the said” and “the shown” consist in two irrevocably 
sundered „camps‟ of content, Brandom allows any implicit practice to be made explicit 
(an example would be noticing a pattern in one‟s reasoning and naming it Modus Ponens). 
He merely notes that this can only happen against a background of further implicit 
practices (in the example just cited  argument categorization). Secondly, although a 
„semantic parasitism‟ exists in both views, it apparently points in opposite directions. For 
where we saw that for Brandom the explicit is parasitic on the implicit, for Wittgenstein it 
appears that what is shown is parasitic on what is said.   
    I will now develop an expressivist view of logical diagrams.    
 
                                                 
12
 I have argued this previously elsewhere: ***** 
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Defining the Diagrammatic 
What exactly is a diagram in logic? Can we give a definition which would cover all cases 
which we would want to call logical diagrams, and not cover any cases which we would 
not? Let us begin by trying to define a diagram more generally. Figure 1 would appear to 
be a paradigm case  so what is „diagrammatic‟ about it? 
     fig. 1 
First of all, it seems capable of conveying some kind of meaning, as it is so structured. 
But whatever meaning it has certainly seems different to that which would be conveyed 
by a piece of prose. How exactly? Most notably by the absence of any words. Therefore 
we might attempt the following definition of diagrams:  
i) “X is a diagram iff there are no words on the page”. 
However fig. 2 fails this criterion. And yet it is arguably a diagram: 
 
 
 
 
 
fig. 2 
One might protest that the „part on the left‟ of fig. 2 is the truly diagrammatic part, while 
the „part on the right‟ is just a label. But one would not wish to say that the part on the 
right is not part of fig 2. It is pointing directly at it and we have conventions for 
interpreting such arrows. Thus having a „truly diagrammatic part‟ seems to be sufficient 
TRIANGLE 
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for being a diagram, at least in this case. So perhaps we can capture this in a new 
definition: 
ii) “X is a diagram iff there are pictures on the page”. 
But what is a picture? Can we give a definition which would cover all cases which we 
would want to call pictures, and not cover any cases which we would not? Perhaps we 
could say that a picture, unlike a piece of prose, is made of joined-up lines? This 
produces another possible definition: 
iii) “X is a diagram iff there are joined-up lines on the page 
However fig. 3 has no joined up lines, only letters. Yet it too is arguably a diagram.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
fig. 3. 
Although it is composed solely of words, they are arranged in a structure, and this seems 
to render it diagrammatic. So maybe we could capture this with a definition something 
like:        iii) X is a diagram iff there is some „non-word component‟ on the page. 
This however seems awfully vague, and even so it is probably not a sufficient criterion. 
(Punctuation? Page numbers?)  
     One might wonder at this point if we are attempting to define something too basic and 
fundamental to be put into words. Or perhaps we are attempting to define something too 
heterogeneous  maybe the concept of a diagram is not a semiotic natural kind? However 
this would be to give up too easily. I will now offer a definition which draws on Charles 
Peirce‟s concept of an iconic sign. Our problem so far has in fact been trying to craft our 
definition merely by inspecting the sign itself. Peirce believed the key issue for clarifying 
this matter is the sign‟s relationship to its object. 
 
TRIANGLE 
TRIANGLE 
TRIANGLE TRIANGLE 
TRIANGLE 
TRIANGLE 
TRI
GL
E TRI
GL
E 
TRIANGLE TRIANGLE 
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Peirce’s Icon: The Sign which Resembles  
Peirce‟s „philosophy of language‟ falls within a much wider theory of signs, or semiotics. 
Including pictures and diagrams is part of the point of this broader disciplinary purview. 
Peirce defined a sign very broadly as any irreducibly triadic relation between a 
representation, an object, and an interpretation. As well as attributing triadic structure to 
the sign itself, he taxonomised signs using a series of three-way distinctions. The icon is  
part of a triad comprising icon, index and symbol, corresponding to the three different 
ways in which Peirce believed a sign could be associated with an object and thus gain 
meaning.  
     Symbols symbolize what they do via some arbitrary convention which must be 
learned. Thus we must learn that the word “banana”, in English, means bananas. All 
words are symbolic to some degree, as they belong to shared public language. However  
as (Perry, 1979), and others showed, language also includes signs which pick out an 
object not by learned convention but via some direct „indicating‟ or „pointing‟ 
relationship (e.g. “here”, “now”). Peirce called these signs indices. Finally icons are signs 
which resemble what they signify (e.g. Peirce, Collected Papers, henceforth CP, 2.304). 
This category is distinct from symbols, as resemblances need not be established by 
convention but can be perceived anew (e.g. “That cloud looks like a frog”). Examples 
include maps, paintings and but also, crucially, mathematical diagrams which function by 
mimicking the structures they signify. 
     This definition of the icon immediately raises skeptical concerns in the minds of 
many. “Resemblance is cheap”, it is thought. Anything can be argued to resemble any 
other thing in some respect. For instance, a photograph of Richard Nixon might be 
thought to resemble other objects qua male (e.g. Brad Pitt), qua brunette (e.g. Elizabeth 
Taylor), qua oval-headed (e.g. an egg), or in many other more recondite ways (e.g. 
“Something in his eyes reminds me of Mt Everest…”) To top it off, the Löwenheim-
Skolem theorem is often vaguely invoked at this point, following (Putnam, 1981), to 
suggest that all the points on one object can be mapped onto all the points on any other 
object to produce an „isomorphism‟, so in some suitably impressive mathematico-logical 
way, a triangle could be „like‟ a square, a cow could be „like‟ a flock of birds and at that 
point the whole business of likeness dissolves into arbitrariness.  
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     How is a serious theory of language, not to mention reasoning, to lean on such an 
apparently subjective pillar? There seems to be an unarticulated yet profound intuition in 
contemporary analytic philosophy that this is why semantics should rest squarely on 
reference, as to make room for the contingencies of the mind‟s ability to creatively notice 
likenesses would introduce theoretical chaos. 
     The worry is very understandable, and properly addressing it would require 
excavating and settling a number of very deep issues. I will mention three. i) One will 
need to argue for a realism about structures which is arguably underappreciated since the 
Quinean equation of ontological commitment with the bound variable noted above.
13
 For 
Peirce claims that the parts of an icon bear the same relationship to one another as do the 
parts of the object the icon represents (Peirce, CP, 3.363). This seems to be a good way 
of explicating structure, and it is worth highlighting that icons are the structural signs par 
excellence, in terms of their means of signification. For although indices may be words 
and to that degree possess internal complexity (in the individual letters), their signifying 
function is to serve as a pure pointer. The word „here‟ indicates a location in space  it 
does not „say‟ anything else. And although the convention by means of which the symbol 
symbolizes what it does may have structure, that structure is not internal to the sign itself. 
For instance the word „dollar‟ represents what it does in NZ society by a complex set of 
conventions involving different coloured notes, numbers on a screen in internet banking, 
and so on, but none of these „convention-parts‟ are related in the same way as are the 
parts of the word „dollar‟ itself (once again: its individual letters). However in a map of 
New Zealand we discover that Hamilton is West of Napier by observing the relevant 
spatial relations in the map itself.  
     ii) The second issue concerns properly understanding the role of the icon, which is not 
to generate ontological commitments in the simple denoting way that many in the 
Quinean tradition envisage. Denotation is the role of the index – but it can only peform 
this function when appropriately supported by the other two sign-types. In fact Peirce 
believed that icons, indices and symbols play three different functional roles whose co-
presence and coordination is vital for language to function as it does. It is worth 
explaining these roles. Firstly, the symbol‟s conventional nature means that it signifies 
                                                 
13
 Pace the recent structuralist movement in philosophy of science 
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general properties, because conventions are “general rules” (Peirce, CP, 3.360) which 
can be applied any number of times in situations which display the appropriate (general) 
features. Secondly, due to their pure pointing function, indices designate particular 
existence – Peirce writes, “[a]n indexical word…has force to draw the attention of the 
listener to some hecceity common to the experience of speaker and listener” (Peirce, CP, 
3.460). Finally, icons designate neither general facts nor particular existences. Rather 
they signify hypotheses, possible situations (Peirce, CP, 3.362). Relatedly, it is important 
to note that these three sign-types are not mutually exclusive in that a single sign can 
serve as icon, index and symbol in different respects all at the same time.
14
  
     iii) As for the re-introduction of the mind‟s creative powers to semantics and the 
theory of inference – the issue here is to embrace it, unnerving as it may be – this is long 
overdue. There is a long tradition of debate in philosophy over whether the thinking mind 
is essentially active or passive, with rationalists preferring the former camp, empiricists  
the latter. It is a major difference in the thought of Kant and Hume. Although it must be 
conceded that Hume did highlight the imagination, seemingly an active faculty, to a 
degree unmatched by other British empiricists, nevertheless he explicated this faculty 
within a naturalistic perspective with strong determinist implications (and when he 
discussed the problem of free will arguably offered a compatibilist “cop-out”). At any 
rate, achieving this re-introduction will require mounting some deep challenges 
concerning what a semantics or theory of inference is for. The fields have arguably 
strayed from giving an account of the phenomena in question, too far towards providing 
an algorithm to predict them.
15
 
     Lacking time to properly pursue these three large inquiries, I will mount something of 
a preliminary phenomenological argument for the worth of the icon in the robustly mind-
independent field of logic by demonstrating Peirce‟s iconic logic in use (not, I hope, a 
terrible argument for a pragmatist to use.) 
                                                 
14
 An example is a shadow-clock, which is iconic insofar as it represents the 24 hour structure of our day, 
indexical insofar as it relies on the sun physically casting a shadow to tell the time, and symbolic insofar as 
the numerals on the clock-face have meanings which must be learned. 
15
 This might have something to do with the fact that key researchers in semantics and logic in the 1960s 
and 70s also worked in artificial intelligence. 
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Peirce’s Existential Graphs 
Later in his career Peirce developed a diagrammatic logic which he called the Existential 
Graphs (henceforth: EG), claiming that “all necessary reasoning without exception is 
diagrammatic”. His next remark about how these diagrams are to be used is interesting – 
he writes, “…we construct an icon of our hypothetical state of things and proceed to 
observe it” (Peirce, CP, 5.162). I will demonstrate this system in its simplest, Alpha 
Graph form, which is provably equivalent to modern propositional logic. But first, here is 
a traditional (natural deduction) proof for purposes of comparison:  
Proof I “Symbolic Logic”:  ⊦ (P  ~P) 
 
This proof seems to be purely sentential in Mumma‟s terms. Observe the length required 
to establish the simplest of tautologies! 
     By contrast, the EG uses no connectives between sentence letters. Rather it represents 
conjunction by placing two sentence letters on the same “sheet of assertion”, and 
negation by drawing a line or „cut‟ around the proposition („graph‟) in question (see fig. 
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4). A benefit that has been claimed for logical diagrams is so-called free rides (Barwise 
and Shimojima, 1995). One can immediately „see‟ certain logical equivalences.16  
 
 A       C                  A                
       fig. 4  
   A & C                ~A        
Thus, fig 5 may be observed to elegantly represent:  ~(A & ~C), (A  ~C) and 
(A  C) simultaneously: 
 
 A         C  fig. 5 
This is an immediate perception. How about a proof? First we need some rules. 
     Alpha Graph rules are 6, each of which consists in a permission to either write or 
erase a graph on the sheet of assertion. I here use (with permission) the beautiful 
presentation of the rules by Jay Zeman.  Single arrow rules are to be read from left to 
right. Double arrow rules consist of two rules – the first read left to right, and the second  
right to left.  
 
 
                                                 
16
 Shin also calls this the “multiple carving principle” (Shin, 2004, p. 77). 
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Proof Rules for Alpha Graphs    (Zeman, 2002) 
 
0.01 Insertion in odd: 
 
 
 
  
 
 
0.02 Erasure in even 
 
 
 
  
 
0.03 Iteration and 0.04 Deiteration 
  a) In the same area: 
 
 
 
  
  b) “Crossing Cuts: 
 
 
 
  
 
0.05 and 0.06: Biclosure 
 
 
 
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I will now perform two proofs, beginning with the simple tautology proven above: 
Proof II, EG:  ⊦ (P  ~P) 
First, rule 0.05 allows the adding of a double negation anywhere (this is frequently the 
first step): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule 0.01 allows any graph whatsoever to be added in an oddly enclosed area. Not very 
surprisingly, we choose P: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Rule 0.03b) (Iteration “Crossing Cuts”) allows P to be re-scribed into the evenly enclosed 
space within: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Our tautology is now most easily proven.  
 
Proof III, EG:(P  Q),(Q  R) ⊦ (P  R) (Hypothetical Syllogism) 
We begin by scribing the premises on the sheet of assertion: 
 
 
 
 
                   
P 
P P 
P Q Q R 
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Next we iterate the right-hand portion of the diagram inside the left-hand portion, using 
Iteration Crossing Cuts (0.03b): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
We now deiterate the innermost Q, by (0.04b): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
We now deiterate the other Q on the left-hand side, using Erasure in Even (0.02): 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
We may now remove the double negation (“biclosure”) around R on the left-hand side 
(0.06): 
 
 
 
 
                   
 
And the final result is achieved by using 0.02 to erase the right-hand side (functionally 
equivalent to conjunction elimination): 
P 
   
Q 
 
Q 
 
R 
Q 
   
Q 
   
R 
   
P 
   
Q 
 
Q 
 
R 
Q 
   
 
   
R 
   
P 
   
Q 
 
Q 
 
R 
 
   
 
   
R 
   
P R Q R 
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Now think about how this procedure might work if we attempted to prove the invalid: 
 (P  Q),(Q  R) ⊦ (R  P). It is not possible as our proof puts P in the 
outermost (odd) enclosure, and there is no way consistent with the rules that it can be 
removed. Graphs in odd enclosures may be iterated inwards, but never removed. 
 
Logical Diagrammatic Forcing.   
We may now see that a “logical diagram” includes its rules of use, not just pictures on the 
page. It is no accident that the EG rules were presented before the diagram was 
constructed to furnish the proof. These rules are of course explicit representations of 
implicit reasoning practices
17, to use Brandom‟s terminology. We do not understand the 
rules without understanding the actions (literally adding and removing graphs from the 
diagram) which they represent. Once we understand the rules and most importantly – use 
them, we directly experience the impossibility of rendering a contradictory proposition or 
invalid argument on an EG. We are forced to recognize how some part of what we are 
trying to realize „has to give‟. We thereby „see‟ (in some arguably metaphorical, but 
powerful sense, which means something like „structurally perceive‟) logical necessity. 
This is the “faculty of intellectual intuition” so facilely dismissed by Ayer. It is crucial to 
note that this intuition occurs not by having epistemic contact with any further „necessary 
object‟ (whatever that might be), but merely by fully grasping the relationships amongst 
the diagram‟s different parts, already present on the page.  
     At the same time it is important to note that not all aspects of Peirce‟s logical 
diagrams are forced by their structure, and thus iconic. Some aspects are symbolic – for 
instance one must learn the convention that letters correspond to propositions, and not to, 
say, predicate letters applied to an object represented by the larger circle.  Some aspects 
                                                 
17
 Which is not to say that ordinary reasoners would necessarily recognize them as such. This is theoretical 
not applied logic (what Peirce called logica docens, opposing it to logica utens: a distinction that medieval 
logicians drew). 
P R  
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of the graphs are also indexical. For instance the sentence letters serve to indicate 
particular propositions (which are indicated in somewhat vestigial form  as 
propositional logic is characterised by abstracting away from atomic propositional 
content  yet remain as crucial place-holders). This is how Peirce‟s semiotics works – all 
three kinds of sign need to be present and to work together to create significance.  
     We have seen that so-called „iconic logic‟ is not purely iconic. At the same time, so-
called „symbolic logic‟ is not purely symbolic. Natural deduction, used in Proof I above, 
also has rules, forces certain results and forbids others, and is iconic to that degree. We 
therefore do not have symbolic logic and iconic logic, strictly speaking. We have logical 
systems whose iconicity is more or less perspicuous. If we bear in mind our initial 
definition of the icon, that its parts are related in the same way that the objects 
represented by those parts are themselves related, perspicuity consists in as many of the 
relationships on the diagram as possible representing logical, as opposed to arbitrary 
relationships. Peirce believed his system was more perspicuous than the „algebraic‟ logic 
he had worked in prior to developing the EG, and that it would be useful, not for proving 
results the other couldn‟t, but for studying logical form more clearly and minutely. 
 
Conclusion  
This paper has presented an expressivist view of logical diagrams. Thus Brown is 
vindicated in his claim that, “pictures hav[e] a legitimate role to play as evidence and 
justification”. In fact we now see that all formal logic is essentially diagrammatic, 
although we have seen that the diagrams may be more or less perspicuous. We can also 
see that Mumma‟s definition of the „purely sentential proof‟ he wishes to argue against 
(“[a] proof…is a sequence of sentences. Each sentence is either an assumption of the 
proof, or is derived via sound inference rules from sentences preceding it”) wears 
incoherence on its sleeve. For once one adds „sound inference rules‟ to the mix, one has 
more than just a sequence of sentences.  
     One might ask: But what about the visual-expectation-derived mistakes which 19th 
century mathematicians learned to avoid? If we embrace diagrammatic reasoning, how do 
we know we won‟t be led into error in this field? This is a good question. The short 
answer is: Get better diagrams. The long answer (which would involve formulating a 
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principled account of which structural features of a diagram represent necessary truths, 
and which do not
18
) will take much further work to determine.   
     Through diagrams such as Peirce‟s EG, logical necessity is presented to the human 
mind in such a way that it can be understood and learned. And what more could we ask in 
order to say that a system of signs represents something, or has genuine content? But at 
the same time the diagrams do not state logical necessity in anything like Ayer‟s sense of 
literal significance. The graphs do not put forward an empirical hypothesis. They provide 
the means for us to exercise our rational intuition. Moreover, if we turn once again to 
Quine‟s criterion for ontological commitment, the basis for the metaphysical realist 
semantics pervasive today, we can see the graphs do not fit this model either. They do not 
gain their content by denoting further objects (in the way that “The cat is on the mat” is 
commonly understood to denote a cat, and a mat). Rather, as icons, everything needed for 
logical insight is already internal to them as signs  one merely has to attend to their 
structure. 
     We might pause in closing and ask: what are the implications of this expressivism for 
realism about logic? For instance, does it show that the discourse of logic does not „talk 
about real mind-independent things‟? My answer will be: No, but that our notion of „real 
mind-independent things‟ requires some surgery. 
     It was noted that a great deal of recent metaphysics is semantics-driven,
19
 although 
metaphysical realists sometimes feel a little guilty about this, as it would seem that their 
very realism should lead them to try to keep semantics and metaphysics separate. I would 
say, actually it is fine to derive one‟s metaphysics from one‟s semantics – just please, 
please get a less simplistic semantics! We may understand Quine‟s criterion of 
ontological commitment in Peircean semiotic terms as an attempt to place the full burden 
of representing reality onto indexical signs. This leads philosophers with realist 
sympathies to feel they need to ask a raft of questions of the form: “Does term X [e.g. 
ethical or aesthetic predicates, number-terms…] denote a real object?” If we recall that 
indexical signs pick out independent particulars, it often seems hard to answer “yes” to 
                                                 
18
 The work of Ken Manders may be understood as seminal in this regard. See for instance his (2008/1995). 
19
 Thus for instance, Chrisman sums up much recent metaethics by writing, “The realism debate has been 
pursued (mostly) by investigating the appropriate semantic account of ethical statements” (Chrisman, 2008, 
p. 334).  
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this question for manifestly important human discourses (such as ethical or aesthetic 
predicates, number terms…). On the other hand, those who are unsatisfied with 
metaphysical realism‟s problematization of such areas, and those who wish to recognize a 
manifest social input to human language-games, often oppose metaphysical realism with 
some form of conventionalism which argues that term X does not denote a real object but 
has some other socially sanctioned and taught function. We may understand such a 
conventionalism in Peircean terms as trying to understand all signification as performed 
with symbolic signs. (We saw that the symbol is the sign whose meaning is derived via 
convention.)  
     Metaphysical realism and conventionalism are assumed to be polar opposites. So 
many dialectics in so many papers in so many areas of philosophy revolve around this, so 
that an argument against metaphysical realism is more often than not assumed without 
question to be an argument for conventionalism, and an argument against 
conventionalism is more often than not assumed to be an argument for metaphysical 
realism. But this is a false dichotomy. A third kind of signification exists which does not 
consist in brute denotation or in arbitrary convention, but which presents structure 
directly to the mind‟s eye. It is barely glimpsed in formal semantics today. And yet it is 
this kind of sign that represents logical form – hardly a trivial part of our conceptual 
scheme. If we could only recognize that the symbol, the index and the icon all have a 
unique and irreducible semantic role to play, and that reality correspondingly is 
comprised of real conventions, real particulars and real intrinsic structures, we would 
make some progress towards understanding that most contested concept.  
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